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Intellectual Property, Innovation,
& Decision Architectures
Tim Wu†
Much of the debate in modern intellectual property and related fields
boils down to a single question: When might the assignment of property rights
have anti-competitive consequences? The traditional yet still central economic
answer to this question relies on a model of monopoly pricing.1 It emphasizes a
tradeoff between incentives created by property grants against the resulting
higher prices and deadweight loses. Under this model, intellectual property
grants are desirable to the extent they encourage new product development at a
reasonable cost.
This essay proposes a different new way of looking at this central and
difficult problem, borrowing from the insights of organizational economics.2
Intellectual property assignments must be assessed not only by the
incentive/cost tradeoff, but by their effects on the decision architectures
surrounding the property right—their effects on how firms make product
innovation decisions. The question is important because different decisional
structures for product development can be fundamental to the performance of
firms, industries, and even the economy as a whole. For example, different
architectures of product development were among the principal differences
between the centrally planned economies of Communist countries and market
economies.3
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1
See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53
Vand. L. Rev. 1857, 1858 (2000) (discussing deadweight loss analysis and its limits).
2
Some of the work relied upon includes Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The Architecture of
Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 Amer. Econ. Rev. 716 (1984); Raaj Sah &
Joseph Stiglitz, The Quality of Managers in Centralized versus Decentralized Organizations,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 289 (1991); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics,
Organization & Management 113-125 (1992); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C.
Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 American Economic Review 465 (1990); Patrick Bolton &
Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network, 109 Quarterly J. of Econ., 809
(1994); Eric Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (2005); Luis Garicano, Hierarchies and the
Organization of Knowledge in Production, 108 J. Political Econ. (2000); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 (1997).
3
See Stiglitz & Sah, supra n. 3.
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Consider two areas of contemporary controversy where this analysis
makes a difference: (1) broadcast spectrum reform, and (2) derivative works in
copyright. If government were to assign property rights in spectrum, as first
suggested by Ronald Coase, will that promote orderly investment in spectrumusing technologies, or retard the full range of uses that might emerge in a
decentralized, non-propertized commons?4 Second, current copyright law gives
the author, among other rights, the exclusive right to authorize follow-on works,
like a film based on a novel.5 Does that centralization of follow-on decisions in
the author promote the creation of better films, or inhibit what would otherwise
be a desirable competition between several films based on a popular novel?
These are hard problems, and just a sample of the situations where the grant of a
property right might radically affect the way industry decisions are made.
The economic literature on decision-making architectures can help answer
these kinds of questions. It makes an important and useful distinction between
hierarchical (centralized) and polyarchical (decentralized) decision architectures.6
In the former, decisions are made by a few individuals with others providing
support. A polyarchy, conversely, is characterized by multiple, potentially
competing decision-markers who may undertake projects independently. The
key point of this paper is that government’s decisions with respect to property
assignments can steer decision architectures toward a polyarchical or hierarchical
architecture, respectively. In general broad rights or rights held by a limited
number of parties promote a hierarchical decision architecture. Conversely, nonassignment of rights leads to the market default: a polyarchical decision-making
architectures, where any firm or individual may decide to undertake a new
project.
This distinction gives us a new perspective on when intellectual property
rights should be assigned, and what their optimal scope is. In general,
economists favor decentralized decision structures in economic systems, based
on the observation that free market economies perform better than planned,
centralized economies.7 This suggests—even accepting the useful, incentives
created by intellectual property—at least one reason to be cautious about the
assignment of broad rights. The danger is that centralization of investment
decision-making may block the best or most innovative ideas from coming to
market. This concern must be weighed against the desirable ex ante incentives
created by an intellectual property grant.
On this debate see Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law. & Econ, 1
(1959); Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 Harvard Journal of Law
& Technology 25 (Fall 2002); Stuart Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between
Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2007 (2003).
5
17 U.S.C. §106(2).
6
See, e.g., Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies
and Polyarchies, 76 Amer. Econ. Rev. 716 (1984).
7
Fredrick Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945).
4
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Despite this presumption in favor of decentralization there are also certain
scenarios where hierarchical structures do perform better. Given an initial
mixture of good and bad (profitable and unprofitable) ideas, hierarchies will
tend to filter out too many good ideas, but make fewer mistakes. Decentralized
polyarchies, meanwhile, invest in more bad projects and even outright fiascoes
but also more new and innovative ideas. That suggests that in some information
environments a more centralized decision-architecture will be optimal. Where
technologies are stable and where the industry is flat or in decline, avoiding
mistakes is more important, and uncertainty may be more limited, meaning that
a hierarchy will produce a more profitable outcome.
Part 1 introduces the distinction between hierarchies and polyarchical
decision architectures. Part 2 discusses the relationship between intellectual
property and innovation policy. Part 3 asks how the analysis in this paper might
influence intellectual property policy.

1.

Hierarchies and Polyarchies

Since the 1970s and especially over the last decade, economists have taken
great interest in the problems of organizations and the transmission of
information within them. One important question across a variety of contexts is
how performance is affected by centralization or decentralization of decisionmaking authority. For example, given a manufacturing firm that must choose
among products to invest in developing, will the firm be more profitable if (1)
decentralized units decide on products, or (2) every project is approved by a
centralized structure before resources are committed?
The contemporary economic literature begins with a central assumption
that is usually missing from the existing legal literature on intellectual property
and innovation. The assumption is that human decisions are fallible.8 Decision
makers act on imperfect information, for a number of reasons, including limited
time, and the both the costs and erroneous nature of information transmission.9
As a result, they often make mistakes. They cannot be certain, in advance, which
of a portfolio of new products will be actually be profitable and warrant
investment. Product development and innovation, based on this simple
assumption, is a highly error-prone exercise.
Based on that premise, economists have distinguished two basic decisionarchitectures designed to weed out errors: polyarchies and hierarchies,
corresponding to decentralized and centralized structures, respectively.10 A
polyarchy is a completely decentralized decision-architecture: any single actor’s
8

See Raaj Sah, Falliability in Human Organizations and Political Systems, 5 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 67 (1991) (discussing the assumption of human fallibility).
9
See Bolton & Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network, supra n. __.
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approval of a project is sufficient. Conversely, in a hierarchy, the approval
architecture is modeled as a serial decision-making process—all parties must
approve a project for it to go forward. The simplest or two-actor versions of
each of these decision architectures can be pictured as follows.
Polyarchy

Hierarchy
Rejected

A

Potential
Projects

Developed
Projects

Potential
Projects

A

B

Developed
Projects

B
Rejected
Rejected

As discussed above, a critical assumption is that in both systems, choosing
successful products is difficult (this correlates to the real world, where a small
percentage of new products succeed).11 The relevant decision makers make two
types of mistakes: they filter out projects that are in fact profitable (what
statisticians call Type I errors) and also fail to squash projects destined to fail
(Type II errors). The difference then is in the kinds of errors that dominate in a
hierarchy and polyarchy, respectively. Under basic assumptions, a polyarchy
like that described here will generally approve more projects than a hierarchy.12
This can be shown intuitively based on the diagram above. If for a given project
P, both A and B have a 50% chance of approving it, the polyarchy will approve
the project 75% of the time, while the hierarchy will approve it 25% of the time.
As a result, the polyarchy will commit less errors of a “missed-opportunity”
nature (Type I errors), but more errors of the “bad investment” nature (or Type II
errors). The opposite is true for hierarchies: the costs of a hierarchy are greater
rejection of projects that should have been accepted.
Given their different capabilities, when will decentralized decisionarchitectures outperform hierarchies, and vice versa? That question is a topic of
10

For more detailed models of polyarchies and hierarchies, see, e.g., Sah & Stiglitz, supra n. __;
Patrick Bolton & Joseph Farell, Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay, 98 J. Political Econ. 803
(1990).
11
See Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, New Product Management for the 1980s (1982) (showing that
most new products fail). There is a related literature that tries to capitalize on a different mode
of innovation to prevent errors, namely, innovations created by “lead users” who as users have
particularized information as to how a product might be made better. See Eric Von Hippel,
Democratizing Innovation (2005).
12
See Stiglitz & Saah, supra n. __, 724-725.
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growing economic literature only some of which is relevant here.13 An early but
still important answer to this question focuses on the relative scarcity of
profitable ideas. In an environment where profitable ideas are scarce, Joseph
Stiglitz and Raaj Sah demonstrated that a polyarchy should be expected to
outperform a hierarchy (and vice versa).14 The reasoning followed from the
premise: since polyarchies by design reject fewer projects, they manage to
capture the few available profitable ideas. Conversely, where good ideas are
plentiful, polyarchies create waste by approving too many bombs. A useful
corollary is that the performance of a polyarchy or hierarchy depends on the
information environment.15 In a period of great change or uncertainty, the most
fruitful line of inquiry may be particularly hard to ascertain, making the ability of
polyarchies to turn up innovative ideas particularly useful. Conversely, in a
stable business environment, avoiding mistakes and getting things right may be
more important.16
This work, as we will see, has direct relevance for intellectual property
problems.17 But before exploring those questions we turn first to the traditional
framework for understanding the relationship between intellectual property and
innovation.
2. Intellectual Property & Innovation
Other authors have focused on the nature of the relevant information to be transmitted as
favoring centralized or decentralized decision-making respectively. Information that might be
easier to transmit (“hard” information), like numbers can be handled well by a hierarchy, while
“soft” information like a subjective assessment of managerial ability might be better processed by
decentralized actors. See Stein, supra n. __, Information Production and Capital Allocation.
Patrick Bolton and Joseph Farell have also emphasized the relative quickness of centralized
decision-making structures, which seems less important in the intellectual property context. See
Patrick Bolton & Joseph Farell, Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay, 98 J. Political Econ. 803
(1990).
14
See Stiglitz, supra n. __.
15
Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Lecture, Dec. 8, 2001, at 19.
16
The evolutionary economics literature reaches similar results, albeit based on different
assumptions and models that will not be detailed here. Richard Nelson & Sidney Winter
emphasized the uncertainty and contingency of technological outcomes—their models predict
multiple possible equilibria, rather than a single, predictable outcome. See Richard Nelson &
Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theoryof Economic Change 14-16 (1982). Firms depend on a set
of routines that survive unless the firm dies or manages to mutate its way of doing business.
That suggests, as does the decentralization literature, the importance of a trial and error approach
to innovation decision-making in uncertain information environments.
17
In other work, Stiglitz and Saah also showed that hierarchies tend to vary in quality much more
than polyarchies. See Stiglitz & Sah, The Quality of Managers in Centralized versus
Decentralized Organizations, supra n. __. In other words, a great hierarchical decision-making
architecture will perform far better than a polyarchy, but a terrible hierarchy makes the worst
decisions of all. (This is similar to the old point that the best monarchy is better than the best
democracy, but the worst monarchy is worse than the worst democracy). Polyarchies in this
view have something of a leveling effect on the quality of decision-making.
13
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The classic analysis of intellectual property and innovation is a
comparison of dynamic benefits and static costs.18 The benefits of a promise of
intellectual property rights are the creation of incentives to invest in the research
and development of new products. The static costs are measured as consumer
deadweight loss resulting from higher pricing, the result of market power
conferred by intellectual property. The optimal assignment of intellectual
property rights must balance the incentives created against the deadweight loss.
The graph usually used to show the costs of intellectual property is pictured
here.
P

Pm

Deadweight Loss

Pc

Q

While this model remains the starting point, over the last decade scholarship has
progressed to the point that no one believes that it delivers a full picture of the
costs or benefits of intellectual property. The scholarship can be divided into
three categories: one group emphasizing neglected costs, another, neglected
benefits, and a third challenging the model itself. On the costs side, Michael
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg focus on transaction costs made necessary by the
collection of rights—what they term an “anti-commons” problem.19 In patent, a
number of authors suggest that firms build patent “thickets” that block their
more innovative competitors.20 On the benefits side, William Landes and
Richard Posner emphasize the static benefits of intellectual property, particularly
stressing reductions of transaction costs.21 Douglas Lichtman’s work also
emphasizes static benefits, including price-coordination functions of intellectual
18

Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 36-50 (5th ed. 1998).
Heller & Eisenburg, supra n. __.
20
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
in Innovation Policy and the Economy (A. Jaffe et al., eds., 2001); Bronwyn Hall and Rosemarie
Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US
Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND Journal of Economics 101 (2001).
21
See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of Intellectual Property (2003); Douglas
Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 Journal of Legal Studies 615
(2000).
19
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property, and evidentiary functions of copyright.22 Clarisa Long has suggested
that patents may be a useful and credible way for firms to signal their
technological prowess.23
Finally, some challenge the economic assumptions underlying the model
or address different models. Edmund Kitch is skeptical that the demand curve
will have a negative slope, and joined by Robert Merges, questions the
assumption that intellectual property rights create market power. 24 Mark
Lemley suggests the model fails to direct sufficient attention to how intellectual
property law treats improvers, as opposed to the original inventors.25 Randal
Picker’s work stresses intellectual property’s role in mediating market entry.26
Finally, in earlier work I have presented a public choice model of intellectual
property rights assignment, suggesting that interest groups use copyright to
slow or block the market entry of potential competitors.27
All of these insights are useful in different ways. This paper, however,
proposes a supplementary approach to assessing the costs and benefits of
intellectual property rights, as the model in the next section shows.
A Model of Intellectual Property and Investment Decisions
The model presented here assesses intellectual property independent of
the costs and benefits central to the monopoly pricing model: incentives to
develop products and deadweight losses. It assumes, initially, that both the
incentives and deadweight losses are inconsequential in a competitive market.28
The purpose is to emphasize a neglected consequence—the effect of property
assignments on product development decisions in the industries influenced by
intellectual property. The central argument is that Government’s assignment of
property rights can influence the decision-making architecture for the economic
system surrounding a given intellectual property grant.

22

Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000) (arguing that intellectual property law should encourage price
coordination in emerging technology contexts); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of
Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003) (describing sections of copyright as motivated by an
evidentiary function).
23
See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625 (2002).
24
See, e.g., Edmund Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1727 (2000).
25
Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Texas L.
Rev 989 (1997).
26
Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST
BULL. 423 (2002).
27
See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278 (2004).
28
This is an unrealistic assumption, but not for all industries. The assumption is relaxed in Part
3.
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Consider an invention I that will be a necessary component for a portfolio
of possible products, named P1...Pn. Some of the products will be profitable,
others not, but consistent with our assumptions of imperfect information their
profitability is hard to know in advance.
The government in our model has two policy options to (1) award a patent
to F1 (the inventor), or (2) not to. The patent in this model gives F1 an inalienable
right to enjoin use of I (that is, it cannot be licensed—like a royal patent in early
England).29 Should government decide to award the patent, the decisional
consequence of that decision are as follows. F1 has the sole authority to decide
which of P1...Pn is profitable and should be developed. While it can solicit advice
and so on, the Government, in our model, has through patent mandated that the
final decision is F1’s to make. The resulting decision-architecture can be pictured
as follows.

Potential
Projects

F1

Developed
Projects

Rejected

Conversely, if government does not award a patent in I, then a set of firms F1...Fn
can decide to develop whatever products P1...Pn they think are profitable. That
decision architecture is pictured here.

Rejected

F1
F2
Potential
Projects

Developed
Projects
F3
Fn
Rejected

29

The assumption is relaxed, infra.
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A natural question is whether policy (1) or (2) will lead to higher profit and
better economic performance. The consequence that this model emphasizes is
the effects on the decision-architecture surrounding the invention I. The results
of the Government’s decision will be a wholly different pattern of product
innovation and development. The centralized and decentralized decision
structures that result will invest in different portfolio of products yielding
different economic outcomes. Over time, the history of the industry dependent
on I may look very different.
A simple historical example may illustrate the model further. Consider an
industry like the late 19th century automobile industry, headed by a promising
invention like the automobile.30 In 1895 the U.S. Government granted a patent in
the automobile to a man named George Selden. It decided to allocate the
authority in Selden to decide whether any project involving the basic elements of
a car (an internal-combustion engine connected to a drive-shaft) would go
forward.31 The Government, by this decision created an initial decisional
architecture for the automobile sector: a perfect hierarchy. Selden held the
theoretical right to decide what projects to approve or disapprove in the car
industry. There are, of course, many ideas as to what a profitable car might be.
But Selden had the power to stop the ones he thought would be unprofitable.32
At this point we can understand clearly the difference between the present
model and the classic model. The idea that patent or copyright can block
competition is a familiar part of the classic model. Yet it effect has been
understood as a block of price competition, leading to deadweight loss. What
the model here suggests is slightly different. It emphasizes the blocking of
decision-making capacity among potential competitors to the rights holder. That
is, the relevance of an intellectual property grant is not only that competitors
cannot compete on price, but that they cannot develop projects that they consider
think profitable but that the rights-owner does not.
***
The model’s most unrealistic assumption is that the patent right in
question cannot be transferred or licensed. While inalienable rights were indeed
the model of the original model of royal “letters patent,”33 and still exist to some
extent, inalienable rights are no longer the dominant model. In U.S. patent and
copyright law, the initial allocation of decision-making authority is not a final

This example is also discussed in Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990).
31
Patent No. 549,160, “Road Engine,” issued November 5, 1895.
32
As Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have documented, the effect of the Selden patent was to
slow the development of automobiles for quite some time. See Merges & Nelson, supra n. __.
33
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_patent
30
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allocation.34 The rights holder can either create a decentralized-decision structure
within his own firm, or license others to use invention I in an open manner, if
doing so would yield maximum profitability.
What happens when we relax the assumption of inalienability? This leads
to an important analysis of the decisions made by the rights grantee. The
question is whether the rights-holder will create either (1) an efficiently
decentralized internal structure,35 or (2) license efficiently to create an optimal
decisional structure. A basic insight is that the initial inventor will often but not
always create an efficient internal structure or license when doing so would be
socially optimal.
First, in the organizational economic literature the challenges of creating
decentralized structures within firms have been the subject of some attention.36
Generally, a system of competing firms better resembles a decentralized
decisional architecture than a large firm that has created internal
decentralization. The reason is that minimal firm coherence requires uniformity
in many practices, such as personnel practices, firm culture and other internal
rules. The resulting in-firm decentralization may be incomplete and artificial.37
The second question raises a familiar problem in both the intellectual
property and telecommunications literature—it is the problem of efficient
licensing.38 In general, we should expect a firm to license its intellectual property
to maximize subsequent innovation, because that maximizes the licensing value
of the property in the first place.39 However, there are a number of exceptions to
this observation. We can consider two scenarios where efficient licensing may
nonetheless not occur.
One may be found where the firm is subject to extensive government
pricing regulations. In such a case, a firm may have strong reasons to want to
keep its inventions to itself—namely, the prospect of unregulated revenue.40 If,
for example, Bell’s central technology (voice) is subject to price caps, it may keep
a new technology (DSL) to itself to try and capture the monopoly profits it is
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §201.
The assumption of inalienability is irrelevant to this question.
36
See discussion in Richard Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the
Wake of 9/11 (2005)
37
[note to readers: my discussion of this is incompletely researched]. See Richard Posner,
Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 (2005).
38
Cf. Phil Weiser & Joseph Farrell, Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access Policies:
Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 85
(2003) (discussing scenarios where platform owners license efficiently).
39
For a discussion of these issues, see Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra n. __.
40
Cf. Roger Noll & Bruce Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in
THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290 (J. E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
34
35
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denied in its primary market. This point is related to Baxter’s law, which
suggests that regulated monopolists, unlike other monopolists, may rationally
seek monopoly profits in vertical input industries.
A second exception arises when broad licensing would be optimal for
society but nonetheless not in the narrow interests on the rights holder. This can
happen when the inventing firm is a dominant firm using the prior technology.41
For example, in the automobile example, the owner of the car patent might also
be a dominant manufacturer of horse-drawn buggies. In that case the
manufacturer might want to screen inventions that might challenge the buggy—
like passenger sedans—favoring instead inventions that are no challenge to its
existing market position, like the tractor. The history of copyright and
communications technologies typifies this problem, where the holders of
copyright block or slow dissemination technologies of potentially broad social
value that threaten an existing market position.42 Television broadcasters, for
example, blocked cable television, and AM radio stations tried to stop FM radio.43
This phenomenon might be understood with the help of the neoSchumpeterian literature’s distinction between improving and disruptive
inventions.44 Those in the first category simply make a present business model
more efficient—like an automatic transmission for a car, or a record player that
plays music more clearly. Disruptive inventions, conversely, threaten the market
position of firms reliant on existing technology. The car did not improve but
replaced the horse-and-buggy industry, and today, the same may be true of
digital distribution’s threat to the record industry’s model of CD sales. In such
cases, broad licensing might be socially efficient, but might also mean the death
of the licensing firm—particularly as it may have no comparative advantage
using the new form of technology. Since few firms plan for their own death—
even when that would be an efficient outcome—the temptation to bury a
disruptive invention may be strong indeed.45
***
We have seen that the relaxation of inalienability leads to us to a
discussion of firm-decision making—what firms actually do with the rights
granted. In addition, several insights of the model presented here are unaffected
by the relaxation of inalienability.
First, where licensing is possible, the effects of a grant of rights may hard
to predict, but the effects of non-assignment are more predictable. This matters
See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination (explaining discrimination in the
broadband context); Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, supra n. __ at __.
42
See Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, supra n. __ at __.
43
See id.
44
See Tim Wu, Broadband Debate, a User’s Guide, 3 J. Telecom & High Tech. 69, 88 (2004).
45
Id.
41
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both two types of government decisions, (1) subject matters decisions—decisions
as to whether to grant intellectual property rights at all, and (2) exceptions—
decisions to create limits on the coverage of intellectual property protection
within in industry.
Consider first subject matter decisions. Government is often faced with a
decision as to whether intellectual property should exist at all, either for an
industry or for a type of product or invention. Over the last several decades, for
example, the patentability of software, living creatures, and business methods
has been controversial.46 The analysis here shows that these problems can be
reframed as a choice about decision architecture for the industry in question.
Without any intellectual property rights, absent other barriers to market entry,
the result will be a decentralized decision-architecture—the market default.
Two examples can make this point clear. Business-method patents were
first authorized by the Federal Circuit in 1998.47 The court decided that the
inventor of a new method of business could obtain a patent just like any other
inventor. A major consequence of business method patents, if widespread, is
decisional in nature. They can flip the basic decentralized nature of deciding
how to run a business and improve it in a given industry. For example, if
Federal Express were awarded a patent on its (once innovative) overnight
delivery business method, it would become a centralized decision-maker as to
the future of overnight delivery services. It is true that having a single courier
company eliminates some errors and duplication of resources, but at the cost of
suppressing new ideas for improving the overnight courier method.
A second example is broadcast spectrum, reform of which has been under
consideration for about a decade in the United States. The question is whether
broadcasting at certain frequencies should be propertized—whether some firm
should own the alienable rights to, say, broadcast between frequencies X and Y.
The impact of the government’s decision whether to grant property rights or not
will have important decisional consequences. Granting no rights will create
decentralized market entry for spectrum-dependent projects or technologies.48
Any entity willing to make the investment may develop a project that depends
on access to spectrum may do so, albeit at the cost of many failed projects.
Granting broad or narrow property rights, conversely, makes a hierarchical
decision structure possible in the first place. That is, we should expect to see
greater screening of spectrum dependent projects or technologies before they are
launches. This tells us whether we want a propertized spectrum depends on
See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (discussing the
evolution of patent’s subject matter coverage).
47
See State Street Bank & Trust Co., v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
48
In a centralized economy, the default option is a hierarchy: decision by a government planner.
46
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how important we think it is that spectrum-dependent projects be carefully
screened for their profitability or perhaps other indicia.
Second, even assuming alienable rights the study of decision architectures
gives us a new way to understand the relevance of the exceptions to copyright
and patent law. These exceptions, like copyright’s fair use doctrine have strong
decisional consequences. They amount to a governmental decision not to award
property rights in a narrow instance, and can therefore force a decentralized
decision-architecture surrounding the exception. For example, in copyright the
rule of Sony v. Universal Studios, exempts devices with “substantial noninfringing uses,” like VCRs, from liability under copyright.49 This rule decides
who gets to decide whether a new project that depends on copyrighted works
may go forward. It practice, it affects whether a manufacturer like Sony or Tivo
may design products independent of the film industry’s approval, or whether it
must ultimately turn to a centralized industry for permission.50 A second
example is the allowance of “improvement” patents in patent law. Courts have
generally allowed later-in-time inventors to receive patents based on significant
improvements to an existing invention.51 Thomas Edison’s light bulb, for
example, was not the original invention that is sometimes depicted. It was,
instead, a significant improvement on previous light bulbs that did not last very
long (Edison, however, was granted a very broad patent—this is discussed
below).52 The allowance of patents on improvements has the result of
decentralizing decision-making relevant to an initial invention. Though the
initial patentee will still own the pioneering invention, it will not automatically
own subsequent patents on all related inventions.53 A third example is the
exception for parody in copyright’s fair use doctrine.54 Under U.S. copyright law,
parodies of a work may be produced without the permission of the owner.55 One
effect of this doctrine is decisional. Within the industry, this allows parodists to
decide independently whether they want to invest in a parody project. The
existence of the exception may reflect an intuition that the original author will
make poor assessments of the quality of works whose main goal is the
degradation of the work and the humiliation of the author.
A final insight is that intellectual property ownership and transfer rules
can be used to create desired decision architectures. In U.S. and European
Sony v. Universal Studios 464 U.S. 417 (1984). This rule in presently under consideration by the
Supreme Court in MGM Studios v. Grokster.
50
See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002).
51
See Mark Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra n. __, at 1000-1013.
52
See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
53
Id. at 1009.
54
See 17 U.S.C. §107.
55
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994) (authorizing parody of song “Pretty
Woman.”).
49
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copyright some rights are made inalienable—they stay with the creator of the
work.56 Creating broad inalienable intellectual property rights, as the model
showed, can force centralization of decision-making. Conversely, creating
narrow inalienable rights can create decentralized decision-making. As I have
argued elsewhere, authorial rights in copyright under certain conditions can lead
to product or industry decentralization. 57
3. When is the grant of intellectual property rights desirable?
The paper so far has sought to establish that decisions related to
assignment of intellectual property rights can centralize or decentralize decisionmaking relevant to intellectual property-dependent products. But can we say in
some general way when either option might be desirable? The organizational
economic literature provides some guidance.
To begin, the economic literature has a strong bias in favor of
decentralized economic decision-making, reflecting the disastrous economic
performance of planned economies. The point, made first by Fredrick Hayek,
goes as follows.58 Centralized economic planning, in a world of perfect
information, has clear advantages over decentralized decision making. Ideally, it
eliminates duplication: two gas stations on a single street corner, providing the
same function, can be seen as wasteful. It also eliminates many of the market
failures familiar from the free market—externalities, collective action problems,
and so on. So the problem with centralized planning isn’t that it wouldn’t be
efficient in the abstract. The problem is that no central planner can possibly have
all of the necessary local and national information to make the right decisions.
Instead, terrible decisions are made, as in China’s Great Leap Forward or Stalin’s
various five-year plans.
In the high technology field, an example of the perils of centralization
comes from Japan’s “Fifth Generation Project.” In the 1980s, the Japanese
government, consulting with experts, predicted where computer technology
would be ten years later, and launched a huge national effort to build the
predicted technologies, aiming to leapfrog other countries. The project was,
unfortunately, centered on a mistaken belief in the importance of parallel
supercomputing, and it dismissed other innovations, like the graphical user
interface on the Apple Macintosh. The project was an abject failure that
damaged the Japanese computer industry. “At the end of the ten year period
they had burned through over 50 billion yen.... The workstations had no appeal
in a market where single-CPU systems could outrun them, the software systems
never worked, and the entire concept was then made obsolete by the internet.”59
56

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §106A (visual arts rights).
See Tim Wu, Copyright’s Authorship Policy (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
58
See Fredrick Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945).
57
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These points offer an important warning for industries regulated by
intellectual property. While we may accept that intellectual property offers
strong ex ante incentives to innovate (as did the Fifth Generation project), there is
a flip-side danger of too much centralization of decision-making. While the risk
posed by governmental initiative like Japan’s Fifth Generation project may seem
foreign, intellectual property policies practiced in the United States have
historically created similar consequences. For example, in 1892 the United States
granted an exceptionally broad patent to Thomas Edison for his light bulb. The
result was to centralize light bulb-decision making in the Edison company for
approximately 12 years.60 The results were not inspiring. Improvement in
incandescent lighting became a one-company show, and many competitors were
put out of business. Economists who have studied the period note that
technological progress in lighting slowed during this period—“the broad Edison
patent slowed down progress in the incandescent lighting field.”61
The danger of overcentralization, of course, can be moderated by
numerous policies. First, the early English model of letters-patent is not to be
recommended. Allowing licensing and transfers of assigned rights avoids overcentralization, by making property rights a source of revenue. Other measures
include recognizing the exceptions and limits, described above, that open
decision-making ex poste and lessen the risk of over-centralization. We’ve seen
that allowing improvement patents helps promote decentralization in patent,
and that in copyright the fair use doctrine can provide a similar function.
Patent’s limited term also prevent a single actor from becoming the sole decisionmaker for a given invention forever.
The analysis here may, finally, relate to a recurring policy question—when
should government assign property rights in a new industry? With the arrival of
every industry – automobiles, airplanes, software, computers, internet auctions–
there is always the question of when intellectual property rights of some form
should attach. Sometimes Government hands out rights early, as in the examples
of the lighting, automobile and airplane industries. And sometimes government
waits, as in the example of the software industry, which received copyright
protection two decades after its origins.62
The analysis here favors waiting, for the reasons that follow. An
intellectual property regime is most clearly desirable for mature industries, by
definition technologically stable, and with low or negative economic growth.
59

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_generation_computer_systems_project. I thank
Ed Felten for this point.
60
See Merges and Nelson, On the Complex Economics, supra n. __ at 885-888; A. Bright,
The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change and Economic Development from 1800 to
1947 (1949).
61
Id. at 887.
62
See Nimmer Treatise on Copyright.
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The reasoning is simple: in a stable business environment, good results may be
achievable through incremental, predictable adjustments. In addition, if by
definition profit margins are thin in a declining industry, it will be better to have
only the very best projects come to market (stated otherwise, Type II errors may
have disastrous consequences).63 By the same logic, the case for strong
intellectual property protections may be at its weakest in new industries, which
can be described as industries that are expanding rapidly and where
technologies are changing quickly. In such an environment the most promising
line of development is by definition less clear. A polyarchical decisional
structure may be necessary to uncover the innovative ideas that are the most
valuable, at the costs of multiple failures. Stated otherwise, in markets where
technologies are changing quickly, we should expect, as the literature suggests,
that it would be more expensive if the best products are suppressed. Again,
government, by refusing to grant intellectual property rights, can influence this
outcome. This basic analysis suggests holding off on the grant of rights on
which a new industry may depend.
Do the incentive and deadweight loss effects of intellectual property
grants affect this analysis? They do, by fortifying the conclusion just reached. As
Stephen Breyer and others have pointed out, the need to provide incentives for
product investments depends strongly on the availability of returns from the
market.64 The stronger the market returns, the less government encouragement
—in the form of promised intellectual property rights—are needed.
Consequently, in a rapidly expanding industry, firms already have strong
incentives to bring a new product to market—the returns of the market, and the
advantages of being a first mover. Meanwhile, the costs of an over-centralized
decision-making structure are greater. As a result, the desirability of intellectual
property rights is at its nadir. In a declining and technologically stable industry,
the signs are reversed. The returns from the market are weak, so government
may need to provide incentives to encourage any investment in product
development at all. And as we’ve seen, a centralized decision-making apparatus
may actually be profit-maximizing, because it screens costly errors. The case for
strong intellectual property rights is at its zenith. While the full analysis is
complex, and the questions ultimately empirical, this paper suggests some
reasons to think governments should be patient before assigning property rights
in new and expanding industries.
Conclusion
63

This is a similar argument to Michael Abramowicz’s argument for strong rights in copyright in
general—prevention of “redundancy.” Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization
Approach to Copyright Law, 46 William and Mary Law Review 33 (2004). However I think
Abramowicz is correct only in the declining market context.
64

Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1971)
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The overarching goal of this essay is to focus attention on the importance
of the economics of decision-making for intellectual property policy. As the
importance of intellectual property-dependent industries increases, scholars and
policy makers need a better understanding of how product innovation decisions
are made and how property assignments effect such decisions.
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